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ST. JOHN'S LAW REVIEW
The instant case provides an excellent illustration of the use-
fulness of the restraining notice as an enforcement device. CPLR
5222(a) provides that a restraining notice may be issued by the
clerk of the court or by the attorney of the judgment creditor as an
officer of the court. The practitioner should note, however, that
under City of New York v. Panzirer,20 6 mere service of the restrain-
ing notice does not effectuate a priority for the judgment.
CPLR 5227: Payments of debts owed to judgment
debtor-priority.
In the case of Neilson Realty Corp. v. MVAIC, 207 the petitioner
comnienced a special proceeding pursuant to CPLR 5227 to satisfy
its judgment against the debtor out of a recovery which the debtor
obtained against MVAIC. A cross application under CPLR 5240
was made by an interested party for an order directing that the
fund involved be distributed in accordance with" the following
priority: first, to satisfy the attorney's fee and disbursements
involved in the litigation against MVAIC; secondly, to satisfy the
liens of the insurance company which provided workmen's compensa-
tion payments to the debtor pursuant to Section 227(1) of the
Workmen's Compensation Law; thirdly, to satisfy the lien of the
hospital pursuant to Section 189(1) of the Lien Law, which
provided medical services to the debtor; fourthly, to two physicians;
and lastly, to the Department of Welfare, all of whom claimed
rights via the debtor's assignment of the proceeds of the personal
injury cause of action. The court followed this proposed order of
priority. By so doing, the fund was exhausted, thus leaving Neilson,
the party who commenced the special proceeding, with nothing.
In its opinion, the court noted that the debtor's claim for
personal injuries did not become a debt within the meaning of
CPLR 5201 until the damages were fixed. 208 Thus, when Neilson
served a restraining notice (CPLR 5222(b)) and subpoena on
MVAIC approximately one month after the fixing of damages, it
affected only that amount of the debt which belonged to the debtor.
The court stated, however, that such activities made Neilson a
judgment lienor.209 This statement is not in accord with CPLR
5234 or with a recent case construing this section.21°  These
authorities hold that priority among judgment creditors is deter-
20823 App. Div. 2d 158, 259 N.Y.S2d 284 (lst Dep't 1965).
207 47 Misc. 2d 260, 262 N.Y.S.2d 652 (Sup. Ct. Queens Couhty 1965).
208 Wallace v. Ford, 44 Misc. 2d 313, 253 N.Y.S.2d 608 (Sup. Ct. Erie
County 1964).209 Neilson Realty Corp. v. MVAIC, 47 Misc. 2d 260, 263, 262 N.Y.S2d
652, 657 (Sup. Ct. Queens County 1965).
210 City of New York v. Panzirer, 23 App. Div. 2d 158, 259 N.Y.S2d
284 (1st Dept 1965).
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mined solely from levy of execution or filing of an order and not
from the use of other enforcement devices. This variance, however,
would not affect the result in the instant case since the ranking of
Neilson's judgment was not involved.
The practitioner should note with interest the fact that among
all the outstanding liens attached to the fund, the attorney's fee
had priority. Neilson, in fact, conceded that the attorney was to be
paid before all the other claimants. It appears that the rationale
for this approach lies in the fact that it was the attorney's efforts
which brought the MVAIC fund into existence. The situation is
analogous to the priority given to a mechanic's lien.2 11
Finally, in regard to the assignments of the proceeds of the
personal injury action, the court noted that they did not violate the
prohibition against the assignment of a personal injury cause of
action.2 2  The priority among the assignments was determined by
the date of making, the earlier one having priority. Thus, by
virtue of these statutory liens and assignments, the debtor had
effectively and completely disassociated himself from the MVAIC
fund, leaving no debt available to Neilson.
The decision is illustrative of the broad plenary powers given
the court in a CPLR 5227 special proceeding 13
CPLR 5231: Form over substance-or substance over form?
Recently, the courts of this state were presented with the
following situation. In essence, the petitioner recovered a judgment
in the New York City Civil Court against defendants who lived
within the city but were employed beyond its limits. An income
execution was delivered to the enforcing officer but was returned
unsatisfied. Thereafter, a transcript of the judgment was issued
out of the civil court and filed with a county clerk. An income
execution was then served on the employer by the sheriff in a
county beyond New York City.
In Schleimer v. Gross,"4 the court refused to order the sheriff
to accept and serve an income execution upon the employer. In
so doing, the court noted that under Section 701(a) of the New
York City Civil Court Act, the authority of the enforcing officer to
serve an income execution is limited to the city of New York. In
addition, under section 702 of the same act once the judgment or
transcript is issued out of the civil court and filed with the county
clerk, only a sheriff can enforce it (as though it were rendered by
the supreme court). As a consequence of these provisions, the
211 N.Y. LIEN LAW § 3.
212 N.Y. GFx. OBLIG. LAW § 13-101; Grossman v. Schlosser, 19 App. Div.
2d 893, 244 N.Y.S2d 749 (2d Dep't 1963).
213 Ruvolo v. Long Island R.R., supra note 203.
21446 Misc. 2d 931, 261 N.Y.S.2d 670 (Sup. Ct. Nassau County 1965).
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